This online appendix provides additional, unplanned, exploratory analysis for the registered report titled "Investor Behavior and the Benefits of Direct Stock Ownership".
Analysis by University
In our original proposal, we did not propose to conduct school-specific tests due to concerns about power. Instead, to minimize the importance of any differences across universities on our pooled results, we proposed standardizing all continuous variables within university before pooling the observations. However, testing for school-specific differences could potentially be informative. Thus, below we tabulate the results for each of the primary dependent variables by university. Because each regression is specific to a university, OwnMoney and RegulatoryAlignment are not standardized.
The results for OwnMoney suggest that the treatment effect varies quite a bit across schools, but in no case does the effect reach 10% (two-tailed) statistical significance. There is noticeable difference in the treatment effect between schools one and two; however, we do not have any reason to question the results from either school. We believe the most likely explanation for the negative coefficient for school two is simply low power, given the small sample size (N = 34).
(1) The results for RegulatoryAlignment exhibit some variation across schools, but again the most extreme value for the treatment effect is for the school with the lowest number of observations. Whereas the most negative coefficient for OwnMoney is for university two, the most positive coefficient for RegulatoryAlignment is for university two. Again, for no school does the treatment effect reach 10% (two-tailed) statistical significance.
(1) As part of exploring the differences by school, we also reexamine the results separately by school for the process measures (Table 3) , cross-sectional variables (Table 4) , social connections (Table 5) , and financial variables ( Table 6 ). As with the findings for the main tests tabulated above, we do not find any particularly remarkable evidence; the vast majority of treatment effects we estimate are statistically insignificant, and we do not spot any patterns in the results that suggests anything other than statistical noise.
Analysis by Investment Salience
As in the real world, participants in our experiment vary in how much they care about their investment position (both in the time-series and in the cross-section). Thus, we take a number of steps to identify situations for which investment position is most salient and reexamine our hypotheses.
A LOOK AT THE TIMES-SERIES
We turn to the time-series to see whether purchase behavior changes in the period right after participants receive the monthly performance updates. To conduct this analysis, we aggregate the data so the observation level is university-group (treatment or control)-week, which yields 94 observations. Because this is a relatively small sample size, we caution interpreting the results due to low power. Further, we caution that the dates we sent the reminder emails were not randomly determined-the reminder emails were sent on the 15 th of each month, partly so the final reminder email would be sent shortly before participants received the request to complete our final survey.
In our tests, TotalSpend equals OwnMoney at the university-group-week observation level. Salient_1week equals one for each week that overlaps with the date the investment reminder email is sent. Salient_2weeks equals one for each week that overlaps with the date the investment reminder email is sent as well as the subsequent week. We then estimate the following regressions, interacting Treatment and Salient_1week as well as Treatment and Salient_2weeks.
(1) The results do not support the view that the effect of the treatment is stronger for days immediately following the dates we sent the investment reminder emails.
A LOOK IN THE CROSS-SECTION
Ex ante, we made a number of design choices to make the manipulation as salient as possible given an investment amount that was feasible. For example, we had students opt-in to the study at the beginning to avoid including participants for which $20 was a weak incentive, and we regularly reminded students of the performance of their investments over time. We also found some evidence that participants responded to the $20 investment. For example, we found that Starbucks investors were more likely to access information about Starbucks than control company investors. Nonetheless, we cannot fully rule out the level of the incentive as an alternative explanation for the null results for the hypotheses.
It may be that the incentive is stronger for participants with lower levels of income. We therefore create subsets of data at different levels of income. In the first table below, we exclude high income participants (i.e., participants for which Income >= 4). We then exclude low income participants (i.e., participants for which Income = 1) in the second table below. These splits based on the Income variable yield roughly equivalent sample sizes. The tabulated results are inconclusive, consistent with what we found using the standard crosssectional design reported in Table 4 of the registered report. We also note that including additional control variables, such as demographic characteristics, do not yield statistically significant treatment effects for either table (untabulated). Further, we find similarly inconclusive results when we examine other variables based on a split in Income, including Access, the mediating variables, and the financial reporting variables (untabulated). Overall, there is little evidence that the income of participants before starting their graduate programs has an effect on the strength of the manipulation (an associated treatment effect).
Finally, individuals with a smaller number of other investments may be more or less sensitive to the treatment effects. On the one hand, it is possible that participants who own fewer other stocks would find the experimental manipulation more meaningful. On the other hand, it is possible that participants who hold more other stocks are more likely to attend to the firms they invest in, such that ownership might have a bigger effect on their judgments and decisions. As for Income, we analyzed a subset of the data to further examine the cross-sectional effect of NumberInvestments. Because most participants report having no investments, we split on NumberInvestments = 0 (the first table below) and NumberInvestments > 0 (the second table below).
(1) The tabulated results based on splitting NumberInvestments are inconclusive. We again reexamine the results including control variables and also examine other dependent variables based on splitting NumberInvestments, including Access, the mediating variables, and the financial reporting variables (untabulated). We do not find robust systematic differences when analyzing these tests.
As an additional analysis, given the significance of the treatment on RegulatoryAlignment for US Nationals, we also reexamine the effects of the treatment on RegulatoryAlignment based on the split in NumberInvestments, but now only among US Nationals. We find that the difference in RegulatoryAlignment is significant in the predicted direction (p = 0.09) when we limit the sample to US Nationals. We find that the treatment effect for this subsample is concentrated among participants with a non-zero number of investments. Below we tabulate the results of this analysis. As above, we split on NumberInvestments = 0 (the first column) and NumberInvestments > 0 (the second column), though here only using the subsample of US Nationals:
(1) In terms of economic significance, the treatment effect on RegulatoryAlignment among previous investors (column 2) who are US Nationals is approximately 22 points, which is quite substantial.
